


CENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC



BASIC

OUTLINE PLAN

FOR

BLACKLIST OPERATIONS

TO OCCUPY

JAPAN PROPER AND KOREA

AFTER SURRENDER OR COLLAPSE

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

BASIC

OUTLINE PLAN

"BLACKLIST" OPERATIONS

8 August 1945

- 1. The attached basic outline plan covers operations to occupy JAPAN Proper and KOREA after surrender or collapse of the Japanese Government and Imperial High Command.
- 2. Pending issue of over-all directives by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this Plan is circulated to Senior Commanders and Staff Sections of the United States Army Forces. Pacific as a guide in their planning and preparation for prompt action upon termination of organized resistance in the areas to be occupied. Plans and preparations for this eventuality will be developed and maintained in and advanced state of readiness by higher echelons of this Command as a matter or urgent priority.
- 3. The Plan is being forwarded to the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet and the Commander, United States Army Strategic Air Force for their information.
- 4. Directives for the several operations to be conducted and indicated studies in support of the Plan will be issued by this Headquarters at appropriate times. The Plan itself will be amended in detail from time to time as conditions alter.
- 5. Every precaution will be observed to prevent such planning and preparation from becoming a basis for unfounded rumors of impending termination of the war. These activities represent preparation for an eventuality which might occur at any time, and while of highest priority, in no way reflect a belief in imminence of a cessation of hostilities.


For the Commander-in-Chief:

R. J. MARSHALL, Major General, U. S. Army, Deputy Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

Major General, G.S.C.,

Chief of Starf, G-3.



FOR

BLACKLIST OPERATIONS

TO OCCUPY

JAPAN PROPER AND KOREA

AFTER SURRENDER OR COLLAPSE

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

BASIC

OUTLINE PLAN

FOR

*BLACKLIST * OPERATIONS

TO OCCUPY

JAPAN PROPER AND KOREA

AFTER SURRENDER OR COLLAPSE

8 August 1945

1. DIRECTIVE.

a. This Plan is formulated pursuant to directives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff contained in radiograms WX-17064/14 June 1945, and to verbal directive of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific, 22 June 1945. It covers operations of United States Army and attached forces under CINCAFPAC control, subsequent to sudden collapse or surrender of the Japanese Government and High Command, to occupy JAPAN Proper and KOREA, establish control of armed forces and civil population, and impose thereon those prescribed terms of surrender requiring immediate military action.


The Plan provides for inclusion of the remaining RYUKYUS among CINCAFPAC's areas of responsibility, and regards them as minor off-shore islands of JAPAN Proper, to be occupied when means become available.

Provisions for extended occupation of the several areas and imposition of ultimate surrender terms therein will be covered in subsequent plans upon receipt of necessary directives.

CINCPAC's corresponding plan for conduct of the Naval and Amphibious operations involved in occupation of JAPAN Proper and KOREA is entitled "CAMPUS".

b. Assigned Responsibilities.

(1) CINCAFPAC is charged by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the following basic responsibilities:



Making plans and preparations for the campaign in JAPAN.

He cooperates with the Commander-in-Chief, United States

Pacific Fleet in the plans and preparations for the naval

and amphibious phases of the invasion of JAPAN (WX-62774,

3 April 1945).

- (b) Preparation of plans for occupation of JAPAN Proper (WX-17064/14 June 1945).
- (c) Command of United States Army Occupation Forces in JAPAN (WX-62773/3 April 1945).
- (d) Military Government in JAPAN to include the four main islands, adjacent off-shore islands, KARAFUTO and TSUSHIMA ISLAND (W-79828/9 May 1945).
- (e) Control of U.S.-held positions in the RYUKYUS, including Military Government (V 73 BG 152/18 July and COMINCH/CNO 211820 July).
- (f) Preparation of plans for occupation of KOREA in which Allied Forces will participate.
- (2) CINCPAC is charged by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with:
 - (a) Making plans and preparations for the naval and amphibious phases of the invasion of JAPAN. He cooperates with the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific, on the plans and preparations for the campaign in JAPAN (WX-62774/3 April 1945).
 - (b) Responsibility for Military Government in the MARIANAS.

 BONINS, VOLCANOES, IZUS, KURILES and MARCUS ISLAND (JCS 1231).





- c. Tentative terms of surrender for JAPAN require in substance (JCS 1275):
 - (1) Cessation of hostilities and prompt disarmament of Japanese forces and people wherever located.
 - (2) Relinquishment of all power by the Japanese Government to the designated military commander.
 - (3) Continuation of maintenance of law and order by constituted

 Japanese officials and police.
 - (4) Relinquishment of war-making materials and installations and evacuation of personnel from Japanese-occupied territories as directed by the designated Military Commander.
- d. Although CINCAFPAC plans are drawn with the primary missions of occupying JAPAN Proper and KOREA and a collateral mission of completing occupation of RYUKYUS when means become available, preparation for execution of these missions recognizes that the Joint Chiefs of Staff may direct CINCAFPAC to assume similar responsibilities with regard to additional areas in the Western Pacific.

2. ASSUMPTIONS.

a. Hostile.

- (1) That the Japanese Government and Imperial High Command may surrender at any time.
- (2) That surrender of Japanese Commanders in occupied areas outside

 JAPAN Proper may have to be imposed by force.
- (3) That in event the Japanese Government and High Command in KOREA fail to conform to surrender in JAPAN Proper, appropriate offensive measures will be taken without diversion of means allocated to occupation of JAPAN Proper.





(4) That there is reasonable probability of active post-surrender resistance of considerable proportions within JAPAN Proper, particularly by suicidal elements of the armed forces who will take advantage of any weakness on the part of our forces.

(5) That total Japanese forces to be disarmed will probably amount

to:	JAPAN Proper	KOREA
Army Ground Combat and Service Air Combat and Service (Army & Navy) Naval Crews and Personnel of Shore Establishments	1,060,000 425,000	233,000 27,000
	242,000	10,000
	1,727,000	270,000 1,727,000
Total		1,997,000

(6) That Civilian Volunteer Defense Units requiring disarmament

may	total:		JAPAN Proper	KOREA
		TOKYO PLAIN KOBE-KYOTO-OSAKA NAGOYA North HONSHU SHIKOKU KYUSHU Other Areas	1,000,000 700,000 375,000 60,000 150,000 675,000	
			3,210,000	35,000 3,210,000
		Total		3,245,000

That armament of these units will be incomplete and confined to light weapons.

- (7) That, while at best the civil population of JAPAN Proper will observe an attitude of non-cooperation with our forces, some degree of cooperation may be expected from the civil population of KOREA.
- (8) That stocks and production of foodstuffs within JAPAN Proper and KOREA as a whole will, in general, remain adequate to maintain a minimum subsistence level for the population. That, initially, assistance in distribution of foodstuffs, and some reinforcement of supplies to major urban areas, will be required to prevent starvation and epidemic.





- That road and rail communications in JAPAN Proper will be sufficiently disrupted by air operations to require widespread rehabilitation of critical facilities prior to resumption of essential transportation of foodstuffs and to large-scale movement of our Occupation Forces into inland areas.
 - (10) That allocation of ship tonnage will be required during the early post-surrender period for transportation of materials for shelter for considerable elements of urban populations in JAPAN Proper to prevent epidemic and active unrest during the winter season. That such action will be required in KOREA to a lesser degree.

b. Own Forces.

- (1) (a) That participation by Allied Forces in the occupation of KORFA will be covered in subsequent directives by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
 - (b) That Allied Forces which may participate in occupation of JAPAN Proper will constitute a component of AFPAC Forces.
- (2) That the area of CINCAFPAC control in the RYUKYUS will be extended to include unoccupied portions of that Archipelago.
- (3) That the Commanding General, United States Army Strategic Air Force will support the operations to occupy JAPAN Proper and KOREA, subject to such other commitments as may be directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time.
- (4) That, subject to futher instructions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, prompt occupation of JAPAN Proper constitutes a first charge upon resources available to CINCAFPAC, CINCPAC and CG USASTAF. Concurrent occupation of KOREA constitutes a charge second only to JAPAN Proper in allocation of such resources.
- (5) That CINCAFPAC will be charged by the Joint Chiefs of Staff
 with imposition of surrender terms upon all Japanese located
 within his areas of assigned responsibility.

- (6) That CINCAFPAC will be designated to coordinate and enforce upon the Central Japanese Government and Imperial High Command the demands upon those bodies of Commanders designated to occupy areas outside JAPAN Proper.
- (7) That commitments necessary for prompt and effective occupation of JAPAN Proper and KOREA will take priority over any further commitments on the mainland of ASIA or FORMOSA.
- (8) That military necessity will require prompt and widespread physical occupation of JAPAN Proper in order to effectively accomplish disarmament and bring home the fact of surrender to the Japanese people.
- (9) That occupation in KOREA may be confined to major centers providing control of the Japanese Governmental and Military

 Organizations, and the communications of more populous areas.
- (10) That uncertainties of the internal situation in JAPAN will necessitate mounting out of initial Occupation Forces prepared for landings against local opposition.
- (11) That repatriation of personnel of the Japanese armed forces and their auxiliaries into JAPAN Proper from whatever source will be subject to prior approval by CINCAFPAC.
- (12) That redeployment will continue until the full requirements of these operations and any further operation which may be directed into the mainland of ASIA and FORMOSA are satisfied.
- (13) That one Marine Corps of three Divisions will be immediately available to CINCAFPAC for occupation purposes.

3. OPERATIONS.

a. <u>Concept.</u> (See Chart, Annex 3 a, General Concept of Operations).

This Plan covers the "Occupation Period" only. During this period,
control of JAPAN Proper and of KOREA is established by progressive occupation,
initially utilizing forces available to CINCPAC and CINCAFPAC at the time of

surrender or collapse. JAPAN is disarmed and provisions made for early turn-over to separate *Post-War* Governments and Armies of Occupation in JAPAN Proper and KOREA.

The preparation and conduct of the operations are decentralized to designated Army Commanders and their corresponding Naval Task Force Commanders to the greatest extent consistent with essential coordination by Superior Headquarters.

For planning purposes, it is visualized that dispatch of AFPAC Forces immediately available, to JAPAN and KOREA, is in strength to occupy selected major strategic centers against local opposition if offered. These forces are mounted with the maximum expedition permitted by availability of sea and air transport and are provided with appropriate naval support. Strong air and mobile ground forces, provided with immediately available naval support and amphibious transportation, are established at these points in order to isolate JAPAN from ASIA, seize control of higher echelons of government in both JAPAN Proper and KOREA, immobilize enemy armed forces, and initiate operations against any recalcitrant elements in the two countries. These strategic centers remain occupied in strength and serve as bases from which air and ground action can be brought to bear wherever required and from which subsequent occupations are conducted as rapidly as the availability of forces, transportation and the internal situation permits.

Follow-up forces are rapidly dispatched to initial objectives by all available transportation means as arranged by the respective Army Commanders.

Additional areas are occupied in two priorities as follows:

Selected strategic points to establish control of remaining major industrial and political centers and avenues of sea communications.

Selected minor areas to establish control of food supply and of principal overland and coastwise communications.

Objectives selected for occupation in the three priorities or phases outlined in preceding paragraphs are:



KOREA: FUSAN.

PHASE I - KANTO PLAIN, SASEBO-NAGASAKI, KOBE-OSAKA-KYOTO, KEIJO (KOREA), AOMORI-OMINATO.

PHASE II - JAPAN: SHIMONOSEKI-FUKUOKA, NAGOYA, SAPPORO (HOKKAIDO).

PHASE III - JAPAN: HIROSHIMA-KURE, KOCHI (SHIKOKU), OKAYAMA, TSURUGA, OTOMARI, SENDAI, NIIGATA.

KOREA: GUNSAN-ZENSHU.

(Reference Map: Eastern Asia, 1/1,000,000, Army Map Service, Revised (AMS 3) 1944. Japanese place names used).

Additional points in PHASES II and III are occupied within means available as deemed necessary by Army Commanders in accomplishment of their missions.

The directed occupations permit control of the political, economic and military life of the two countries. The areas designated in JAPAN include 60 percent of the population, 80 percent of industrial capacity and 48 percent of food production. Those in KOREA include 39 percent of the population, 18 percent of the industrial capacity and 44 percent of the food production.

Occupations in addition to those outlined above which may be required by national policy or Japanese attitude are directed by CINCAFPAC as dictated by the situation existent at the time.

Disarmament of Japanese Armed Forces and establishment of control of communications are primary initial missions of the Occupation Forces.

The United States Pacific Fleet conducts the naval and amphibious phases of the operations.

The Plan as drawn initially visualizes surrender prior to "OLYMPIC".

In event surrender or collapse occurs after initiation of "OLYMPIC", occupation

of unoccupied objectives listed above proceeds as outlined, leaving minimum garrison in the "OLYMPIC" and any minor occupied areas.

Relative timing of the operations is dependent upon the shipping position at initiation date. Consequently, preliminary estimates of timing are



made as planning guides and indications of relative priority for shipping allocations only. Forces are dispatched in shipping and air lift allocated for movement of forces of the respective Armies as rapidly as they can be mounted.

Occupation of selected objectives may be initiated by employment of airborne forces.

Occupations subsequent to PHASE I are conducted by Army Commanders as rapidly as the situation and availability of forces permit. Amphibious lift is made available in each Army area for this purpose.

The initiation date for the operation (*B*-Day) is designated by CINCAFPAC pursuant to instructions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and will probably precede *VJ-Day*.

Occupation of PHASE I objectives utilizes in general the forces earmarked for "OLYMPIC", plus some elements from "CORONET". Subsequent occupations utilize PHASE I forces, augmented by "CORONET" forces as the situation may demand. PHASE I forces are regarded as firm allocations for commitment as rapidly as practicable. PHASE II forces are allocated to Army Commanders for planning purposes and are subject to release by CINCAFPAC as required. An AFPAC Reserve is retained for disposition as necessary. Major units as received on redeployment are considered as AFPAC Reserve.

Allocations of forces are frequently amended to incorporate changes in availability incident to *OLYMPIC* and *CORONET*.

In event further operations on the mainland of ASIA or FORMOSA are directed, they are initiated subsequent to occupation of PHASE I objectives and establishment therein of adequate protective air and naval elements.

b. Employment of Forces.

(1) Organization.

(a) United States Army Forces, Pacific.

For organization of United States Army Forces, Pacific, and allocation of areas of responsibility for *BLACKLIST* operations, see Annexes 3 a, General Concept, and 3 b

(2) (a), Organization of United States Army Forces.

Juliae

United States Pacific Fleet

Organization of the United States Pacific Fleet for these operations is as prescribed by CINCPAC.

(c) United States Army Strategic Air Force.

Organization of the United States Army Strategic Air Force for these operations is as prescribed by the Commanding General thereof.

(2) Forces.

UNITED STATES ARMY -Command of U.S. Army resources in the Pacific. (Except Alaskan Depart-FORCES, PACIFIC ment, USASTAF and Southeast Pacific).

> Operations of U.S. Army Forces, "BLACKLIST" operations.

Command of AFPAC Occupation Forces and imposition of surrender terms in assigned areas of responsibility.

Approval of repatriation of Japanese Forces and nationals to JAPAN Proper.

Theater Command, SWPA.

1. Sixth Army

Landing forces, KYUSHU, SHIKOKU, and Western HONSHU area.

Operations of Occupation Forces same area.

Preparation of Sixth Army elements from Western Pacific.

Mounting of elements transported

under Sixth Army control.

XXIV CORE

2. Tenth Army

Landing forces, KOREA.

Operations of Occupation Forces same area.

22 Tenth Army

THE THE CANA Preparation of Tenth Army elements from Western Pacific.

Mounting of elements transported under Tenth Army control.

3. Eighth Army

Landing forces, Northern HONSHU, HOKKAIDO, KARAFUTO.

Operations of Occupation Forces, same area.

Preparation of Eighth Army elements from Western Pacific.

Mounting of elements transported under Eighth Army control.

4. First Army (when available)

Preparations for further operations as directed.

Far East Air Force

Land-based air support, "BLACKLIST" operations.

Troop carrier operations.

Preparation of FEAF elements for displacement to JAPAN and KOREA.

Establishment of FEAF elements in designated locations.



6. United States Army Forces,
Middle Pacific

Preparation and mounting of U.S. Army Forces from Middle Pacific for CINCAFPAC as directed.

Logistic support and administrative control of U.S. Army Forces in Middle Pacific.

- 7. United States
 Army Forces,
 Western Pacific
- Logistic support of U.S. Army Forces, Western Pacific.

Logistic support of "BLACKLIST" operations.

U.S. Garrisons, Western Pacific, as directed.

Preparation and mounting of Base Service elements transported under USAFWESPAC control.

Disposition of captured Japanese war material as directed.

- 8. Naval Forces, SWPA
- Preparation and mounting of Naval and Marine elements, SWPA, for CINCPAC.
- (b) UNITED STATES
 PACIFIC FLEET
 (as arranged)
- Naval cover and support, "BLACKLIST" operations.

Naval and amphibious phase,
"BLACKLIST" operations, including,
Sixth, Tenth and Eighth Army, operations.
Preparation and mounting of U.S.
Naval and Marine elements from POA.
Theater Command, POA.

- (c) UNITED STATES ARMY
 STRATEGIC AIR
 FORCE
 (as arranged)
- Transport of troops by air as arranged.

 VHB operations.

(3) Coordination.

- (a) Command relationships between the United States Army Forces,

 Pacific, the United States Pacific Fleet and the United States

 Strategic Air Force, in the conduct of "BLACKLIST" operations,

 are as prescribed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- (b) Commanders, Sixth, Tenth and Eighth Armies, are charged with the coordination of planning of operations within their respective assigned areas of responsibility. Operations are conducted under the principle of maximum practicable decentralization of control in order to achieve objectives in minimum time. Commanders of Naval and Air Task Forces meet with Army Commanders concerned for coordination of planning of operations as directed by their respective Superior Commanders.

- (c) Details of coordination of operations of United States
 Army Forces, Pacific and elements, United States Pacific
 Fleet, within JAPAN Proper and KOREA are arranged directly
 between Army and Naval Task Force Commanders concerned.
- (d) The Commanding General, Far East Air Forces, conducts troop-carrier operations to provide to Army Commanders the maximum practicable air lift of troops to JAPAN and KOREA.

 He coordinates with the USASTAF and ATC as hereafter directed by CINCAFPAC the details of employment of available combat and transport aircraft for troop movement purposes.
- (e) CINCAFPAC arranges with CINCPAC for appropriate transfer to Naval control of naval vessels, equipment, supplies and Intelligence material.
- (f) As arranged with CINCAFPAC, CINCPAC establishes and commands naval terminal and base facilities in JAPAN Proper and KOREA, which are required for support of forces under his command or control.

c. Operations Required.

(1) General.

(a) Designation.

These operations constitute the "B" or "BAKER" series of operations conducted by United States Army Forces, Pacific. Individual operations are designated by numbers within blocks of twenty assigned each of the Army Headquarters concerned. "B"-Day is the date designated by CINCAFPAC for initiation of the operations.

(b) Tasks.

1. General Tasks.

The following general tasks are assigned Army Commanders within their respective zones of responsibility:




- <u>a.</u> Establish control of the armed forces and civil population in areas assigned and impose thereon prescribed terms of surrender requiring immediate military action.
- <u>b.</u> Prepare for establishment of separate post-war Governments and Armies of Occupation in JAPAN Proper and KOREA as subsequently directed.

2. Common Tasks.

The following tasks are common to the several operations projected in this Plan and apply within areas prescribed by the Army Commander concerned:

- a. Destroy hostile elements which oppose by military action the imposition of surrender terms upon the Japanese.
- b. Disarm and demobilize Japanese armed forces and their auxiliaries as rapidly as the situation permits.
 Establish control of military resources insofar as is practicable with means available.
- Control principal routes of overland communications. Control principal routes of coastwise communications, in coordination with Naval elements as arranged with the appropriate Naval Commander.
 - and order are maintained among the civilian population.

 Facilitate peaceful commerce, particularly that which contributes to the subsistence, clothing and shelter of the population.
 - Recover, relieve and repatriate Allied Prisoners of
 War and Civilian Internees without delay.



- g. Suppress activities of individuals and organizations which may be inimical to the operations of the Occupation Forces. Apprehend War Criminals as directed.
- h. Assist with elements of the initial Occupation Forces the occupation of subsequent objectives as directed.
- i. Prepare to impose terms of surrender beyond immediate military requirements as directed.
- j. Prepare to extend controls over the Japanese as required to implement policies for post-war occupation and government when prescribed.
- k. Prepare to transfer responsibilities to agencies of the post-war Governments and Armies of Occupation when established.
- Assist the United States Pacific Fleet as necessary in establishment of naval facilities for naval search and control of coastwise communications as arranged.
- (2) PHASE I. (See Chart, Annex 3 c (2), Concept of PHASE I Operations)

(a) Areas Occupied.

<u>Operation</u>	Area	Force
"BAKER-TWENTY"	KANTO PLAIN	Eighth Army
"BAKER-TWO"	SASEBO-NAGASAKI	Sixth Army
"BAKER-TEN"	OSAKA-KYOTO-KOBE	Sixth Army
"BAKER-FORTY	KEIJO	Tenth Army
"BAKER-TWENTY-ONE"	AOMORI-OMINATO	Eighth Army





(b) Tasks.

1. Common Task.

Naval Commander arranges with the appropriate

Naval Commander the details of employment of an

amphibious lift of one-division capacity for post
PHASE I short-range amphibious operations as required

in the Army area concerned.

Operation "BAKER-TWENTY"; KANTO PLAIN area; Eighth Army;
Target Date for "Y" Day, B # 15.

By joint overseas expeditionary operations, occupy
the KANTO PLAIN area; establish control for CINCAFPAC
of the Central Japanese Government and Imperial High
Command; establish designated air and mobile ground
forces for overland and short-range amphibious
operations in the Eighth Army area as required.

3. Operation "BAKER-TWO"; SASEBO-NAGASAKI area; Sixth Army;
Target Date for "A" Day, B / 20.

By joint overseas expeditionary operations occupy the area SASEBO-NAGASAKI; establish designated air and mobile ground forces for overland and short-range amphibious operations in the Sixth Army area as required; assist the U.S. Pacific Fleet as necessary in establishment of naval base facilities in the SASEBO-NAGASAKI area.

<u>4</u>. Operation *BAKER-TEN*; OSAKA-KYOTO-KOBE area; Sixth Army;

Target Date for *K* Day, B ≠ 23.

By joint overseas expeditionary operations, occupy the area OSAKA-KYOTO-KOBE; establish designated air and mobile ground forces for overland and short-range amphibious operations in the Sixth Army area as required; assist the U.S. Pacific Fleet as necessary in establishment of naval base facilities in the KOBE area.



5. Operation "BAKER-FORTY"; KEIJO area (KOREA); Tenth Army;
Target Date for "E" Day, B / 27.

By joint overseas expeditionary operations occupy the KEIJO area of KOREA; establish control of the Japanese Central Government and Army-Navy Command of KOREA; establish designated air and mobile ground forces for overland and short-range amphibious operations in the Tenth Army area as required.

6. Operation "BAKER-TWENTY-ONE"; AOMORI-OMINATO area; Eighth Army; Target Date for "O" Day, B / 30.

By joint overseas expeditionary operations, occupy the ACMORI-OMINATO area; establish designated air and mobile ground forces for overland and short-range amphibious operations in Northern HONSHU, HOKKAIDO and KARAFUTO as required.

- (3) PHASE II. (See Chart, Annex 3 c (3), Concept of PHASE II Operations)
 - (a) Areas Occupied.

<u>Operation</u>	Area	rorce
BAKER-ONE	SHIMONOSEKI-FUKUOKA	Sixth Army
BAKER-ELEVEN	NAGOYA	Sixth Army
BAKER-TWENTY-THREE	SAPPORO	Eighth Army
BAKER-FORTY-ONE	FUSAN (KOREA)	Tenth Army

(b) Tasks.

1. Operation "BAKER-ONE"; SHIMONOSEKI-FUKUOKA area; Sixth Army;

Target Date for "C" Day, as designated by CG, Sixth Army.

Occupy the area SHIMONOSEKI-FUKUOKA of northern KYUSHU;

establish ground and designated air forces for

accomplishment of common tasks.

- 2. Operation "BAKER-ELEVEN"; NAGOYA area; Sixth Army; Target Date for "M"-Day, as designated by CG, Sixth Army. Occupy the NAGOYA area of Southeastern HONSHU; establish ground forces and air staging facilities for accomplishment of common tasks.
- 3. Operation "BAKER-TWENTY-THREE": SAPPORO area; Eighth Army; Target Date for "W" Day, as designated by CG, Eighth Army.

Occupy the SAPPORO area of HOKKAIDO; establish ground forces and air staging facilities for accomplishment of common tasks. Coordinate activities with CINCPAC forces occupying the KURILE ISLANDS.

- 4. Operation "BAKER-FORTY-ONE"; FUSAN area; Tenth Army;

 Target Date for "R" Day, as designated by CG, Tenth Army.

 Occupy the FUSAN area of Southern KOREA; establish ground forces and air landing facilities for accomplishment of common tasks.
- (4) PHASE III. (See Chart, Annex 3 c (4), Concept of FHASE III Operations)

(a) Areas Occupied.

Operation	Area	Force
"BAKER-THREE"	HIROSHIMA-KURE	Sixth Army
"BAKER-FOUR"	KOCHI (SHIKOKU)	Sixth army
"BAKER-FIVE"	OKAYAMA	Sixth Army
"BAKER-TWELVE"	TSURUGA	Sixth Army
"BAKER-TWENTY-TWO"	OTOMARI	Eighth Army
"BAKER-TWENTY-FOUR"	SENDAI	Eighth Army
"BAKER-TWENIY-FIVE"	NIIGATA	Eighth Army
BAKER-FURIY-PAP	GUNSAN-ZENSHU	Tenth Army



- 1. Operation "BAKER-THREE"; HIROSHIMA-KURE area; Sixth Army; Target Date for "F" Day, as designated by CG, Sixth Army. Occupy the area HIROSHIMA-KURE of Western HONSHU; establish ground forces and air landing facilities for accomplishment of common tasks.
- 2. Operation *BAKER-FOUR*; KOCHI area; Sixth Army; Target Date for *G* Day, as designated by CG, Sixth Army. Occupy the KOCHI area of SHIKOKU; establish ground forces and air staging facilities for accomplishment of common tasks.
- Queration "BAKER-FIVE"; OKAYAMA area; Sixth Army; Target Date for "I" Day, as designated by CG, Sixth Army.
 Occupy the OKAYAMA area, northern shore of the INLAND SEA; establish ground forces and air landing facilities for accomplishment of common tasks.
- 4. Operation *BAKER-TWELVE*; TSURUGA area; Sixth Army;

 Target Date for *N* Day, as designated by CG, Sixth Army.

 Occupy the TSURUGA area of FUKUI Prefecture and adjacent points as required; establish ground forces and air staging facilities for accomplishment of common tasks.
- Operation "BAKER-TWENTY-TWO"; OTOMARI area; Eighth Army; Target Date for "Q" Day, as designated by CG, Eighth Army.
 - a. Occupy the OTOMARI area of KARAFUTO; establish ground forces and air staging facilities for accomplishment of common tasks.
 - <u>b</u>. Coordinate activities with CINCPAC forces occupying the KURIEF ISLANDS.

Operation BAKER-TWENTY-FOUR"; SENDAI area; Eighth Army; Target Date for "S" Day, as designated by CG, Eighth Army.

Occupy the SENDAI-MATSUSHIMA area of MIYAGI

Prefecture; establish ground forces and air landing
facilities for accomplishment of common tasks.

7. Operation "BAKER-TWENTY-FIVE"; NIIGATA area; Eighth Army; Target Date for "U" Day, as designated by CG, Eighth Army.

Occupy the NIIGATA area of Northwestern HONSHU; establish ground forces and air landing facilities for accomplishment of common tasks.

8. Operation "BAKER-FORTY-TWO"; GUNSAN-ZENSHU area; Tenth Army; Target Date for "P" Day, as designated by CG, Tenth Army.

Occupy the GUNSAN-ZENSHU area of Southwest KOREA; establish ground forces and air landing facilities for accomplishment of common tasks.

(5) Contingent Operations.

- (a) Headquarters, First Army, upon activation, is allocated tasks of planning for and conducting further AFPAC operations as directed.
- (b) Requirements for further AFPAC operations and consequent amendments in allocations for JAPAN and KOREA are formulated upon receipt of information concerning objectives and areas to be occupied.

d. Forces Required.

(1) Estimates of the over-all ground and air requirements for Occupation Forces to accomplish PHASE I, II and III objectives, and Troop Lift Requirements for movement in naval assault shipping and by air are shown in Annex 3 d (1).



- (2) "A solution" for employment of major units, ground forces, in "BLACKLIST" operations is shown in Annex 3 d (2).
- Deployment of land-based air forces in the Western Facific for BLACKETT Operations is shown on Chart, Annex 3 d (3).
 - (4) Allocations of Naval assault shipping to meet Troop Lift Requirements for such types (Annex 3 d (1)) and of Naval Support, are made by CINCPAC. Allocations of sircraft for troop lift are made by CG, Far East Air Forces, who arranges for use of aircraft of the USASTAF and ArC as available.
 - (5) Estimates of Forces Required are amended to meet changes in the situation, by timely issue of amended Annexes 3 d (1), 3 d (2) and 3 d (3)
 - 4. LOGISTICS. (See Annex 4, Logistics).

a. General.

- (1) Present logistic planning and instructions covering operation
 "OLYMPIC" are applied to the maximum extent possible in these
 operations, consistent with major changes in strategic and
 tactical concept.
- (2) United States Army and troops attached for the conduct of operations under the control of CINCAFPAC are staged, equipped and mounted out with prescribed equipment and supplies to the extent practicable and in the time alloted from the PHILIP-PINES, RYUKYUS, MARIANAS, and/or HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.
- (3) Naval forces employed in support of this operation under the control of CINCPAC are supported as directed by him.
- (4) United States Army Strategic Air Force is supported logistically in accordance with current arrangements and directives.


b. Responsibility for Logistic Support.

- (1) CINCAFPAC is responsible for the logistic support of United

 States Army Forces and attached troops under his operational

 control employed in these operations, except for Classes II,

 IV and V supplies for Marine and associated Naval forces.
- (2) CINCPAC is responsible for the logistic support of Naval services



under his control. In addition, he is responsible for equipping and providing mounting-out supplies for Marine and associated Naval forces which operate under the control of CINCAFPAC and resupply of Classes II, IV and V for those forces.

- (3) The Commanding General, United States Army Forces, Western Pacific, is responsible (except for the provision of Air Force technical and air ammunition supply) for provision of logistic support for all troops in occupational areas to the water line of the respective areas.
- (4) The Commanding General, Far East Air Forces, is responsible for the provision of Air Force technical and air ammunition supply for all United States Army Air Force troops (except the United States Army Strategic Air Force elements based in the RYUKYUS), employed in these operations, including Marine Air Forces under the operational control of CINCAFPAC.
- (5) The Commanding Generals of Armies are charged with responsibility for logistic support of all troops in their respective occupational areas. Appropriate service troops are attached to Armies for the purpose of rendering direct logistic support in each Army area.
- (6) The Commanding Generals, United States Army Forces, Middle Pacific, Western Pacific and Tenth Army are responsible for re-equipping all units staging in and mounting from their respective areas (and the Commanding General, Far East Air Forces for technical equipment of Air Force units) to the limit of availability of equipment and supplies. They are further charged with supplying to all units mounted, to the extent available, accompanying equipment and supplies as prescribed by this headquarters.
- c (7) With respect to logistic arrangements for RYUKYUS, O.I. No 2, this headquarters, 30 July, governs for this operation.
- c. Resupply

Resupply is by "AUTOMATIC SUPPLY" to the extent practicable with



the then currently available resources, as follows:

- for operation "OLYMPIC", resupply, and supply of the bulk of construction materials as may have to be imported, is by diversion of maintenance shipping from MIDDLE and WESTIRN FACIFIC areas until "OLYMPIC" support shipping becomes available.


 Thereafter, shipping set up for the support of "OLYMPIC" is diverted in quantities necessary to meet "BLACKLIST" requirements.
- (2) In the event "B"-Day occurs at a time shortly approaching or immediately subsequent to "X"-Day, resupply, and supply of construction materials as indicated above, is by diversion of direct shipping set up for "OLYMPIC", augmented as may be required, within availability, from bases in the PACIFIC under the control of CINCAFPAC.

d. Evacuation and Hospitalization.

- (1) Evacuation of casualties by all services from the occupied areas initially is by naval assault shipping, followed at the earliest practicable date by the employment of aircraft and hospital ships.
- (2) Fixed-bed hospital units are established in occupied areas at the earliest practicable date, functioning initially in existing buildings or under canvas.
- (3) Evacuation of Prisoners of War and liberated nationals of
 United Nations is as prescribed in Annex 5 f, Basic Plan, Care
 and Evacuation of Allied Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees.

e. Transportation.

- (1) CINCPAC provides Naval assault shipping for the transportation of initial, follow-up and succeeding Task Forces, with accompanying equipment and supplies from mounting areas to the objective.
- (2) Replenishment supplies, replacement equipment and construction materials are transported direct from the UNITED STATES or bases as indicated in paragraph 4 c above, in heavy shipping



as arranged for by CINCAFPAC and CINCPAC.

(3) The Commanding General, Far East Air Forces, plans for and executes air dropping of emergency supplies to Prisoners of War and civilian internees of United Nations held in known Japanese Camps, exclusive of those in areas under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command, as indicated in Appendix A, to Annex 4, Logistics.

f. Construction.

- (1) Construction in the occupied areas is limited to provision of minimum essential operative facilities. Use of imported materials is kept to an absolute minimum, Japanese materials being utilized to the extent of availability.
- (2) CINCAFPAC and CINCPAC are each responsible for the construction of Army and Naval facilities and installations required for the support of the forces under their respective controls.
- (3) Construction materials and Engineer construction effort required to construct facilities and installations necessary for the support of the forces operating under their control are provided by CINCAFPAC and CINCPAC, respectively.
- (4) The Commanding Generals of Armies are responsible for the construction and development of approved Army construction projects in their respective areas immediately following initiation of operations.

g. Local Resources.

Maximum use will be made of available local resources, including existing installations and labor. Disarmed Japanese Military Forces are utilized for labor to the extent practicable.

5. MISCELLANEOUS.

- a. For Communications Plan, see Annex 5 a.
- b. For Assumed Terms of Surrender, see Annex 5 b.
- c. For Basic Plan for Establishment of Control of the Armed Forces and Military Resources of the Enemy, see Annex 5 c.
 - d. For Basic Intelligence Plan, including Initial Handling of War



Criminals and Security Suspects, see Annex 5 d.

- e. For G-2 Estimate of the Hostile Situation, "BLACKLIST" Operations, see Annex 5 e.
- f. For Basic Plan for Care and Evacuation of Allied Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees, see Annex 5 f.
- g. For Summary of CINCPAC Plan "CAMPUS" for Naval and Amphibious Operations, see Annex 5 g.
 - h. This Plan will be supported by the following:
 - (1) "Basic Plan for Institution of Military Government". This Plan covers Military Governments and Relations of Occupation Forces with the Civil Population in JAPAN Proper and KOREA during the "Occupation Period", i.e., up to the transfer of responsibility to the post-hostilities Governments and Armies of Occupation.
 - (2) Troop Lists, "BLACKLIST" Operations.





Edition 3

8 August 1945

CG.	First Army	1
-	Sixth Army	
	Eighth Army	_
	Tenth Army	
	FEAF	_
	U.S. Army Forces, Western Pacific	
-	ASCOM "C"	_
Sta	ff, GHQl	.5

